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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
SAN JOSE DIVISION 
 
 
DANIEL MATERA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
GOOGLE INC., 
Defendant. 
 
Case No. 15-CV-04062-LHK    
 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
DISMISS AS TO THE MERITS OF 
PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 
Re: Dkt. No. 20 
 
 
Plaintiff Daniel Matera (“Plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, 
alleges that Defendant Google Inc. (“Google”) violated federal and state wiretapping laws in its 
operation of Gmail, an email service.  ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).1  Before the Court is Google’s 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  ECF No. 20.  Having considered the parties’ 
submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES Google’s motion to 
dismiss as to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.  The Court will issue a separate order on standing 
issues. 
 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise noted, all ECF references are to the docket of 15-CV-04062 in the Northern 
District of California. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
1. In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation 
Plaintiff’s factual allegations overlap significantly with those in the related action In re 
Google Inc. Gmail Litigation (“Gmail”), 13-MD-02430, a consolidated multi-district litigation in 
which this Court considered whether Google’s operation of Gmail violated federal and state 
wiretapping laws.  As both the factual and procedural history of Gmail are relevant to the instant 
motion, the Court briefly summarizes the background of that litigation. 
Google provides several different but related systems of email delivery.  First is a free 
service for individual users, which allows any user to register for an “@gmail.com” email address.  
In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig. (“Gmail”), 2013 WL 5423918, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013); In 
re Google Inc. Gmail Litig. (“Gmail Class Cert.”), 2014 WL 1102660, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 
2014).  Second, Google offers “Google Apps” to businesses, educational organizations, and 
internet service providers (“ISPs”).  Gmail Class Cert., 2014 WL 1102660, at *1.  The end users 
of Google Apps do not receive “@gmail.com” email addresses.  Rather, the email addresses 
contain the domain name of the business, educational institution, or ISP that contracts with Google 
to provide the email service (for example, “@cableone.com”).  Id.  However, Google Apps email 
services are powered by Google through Gmail.  Accordingly, users of the individual service and 
users of Google Apps are all Gmail users. 
The Gmail plaintiffs alleged that Google intercepted, read, and acquired the content of 
emails that were sent to or received by a Gmail user while the emails were in transit.  Gmail, 2013 
WL 5423918, at *1.  Google allegedly intercepted the emails for the dual purposes of (1) 
providing advertisements targeted to the email’s recipient or sender, and (2) creating user profiles 
to advance Google’s profit interests.  Id.  According to the Gmail plaintiffs, Google’s interception, 
scanning, and analyzing of email was done without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs.   
As relevant to the instant case, the putative class in Gmail included a class of all United 
States non-Gmail users “who have sent a message to a Gmail user and received a reply or received 
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an email from a Gmail user.”  Id. at *4.  Because non-Gmail users exchange emails with Gmail 
users, the Gmail plaintiffs alleged that non-Gmail users’ communications were subject to the same 
interception, scanning, and analysis as Gmail users.  The Gmail plaintiffs also sought to represent 
(1) end users of Cable One, an ISP that contracted with Google to provide Google Apps-related 
services to its customers; (2) users of Google Apps for Education; and (3) Gmail users under the 
age of majority.   
2. Allegations in the Instant Case 
This case involves a subset of the Gmail putative class.  In the instant case, Plaintiff seeks 
to represent non-Gmail users “who have never established an email account with Google, and who 
have sent emails to or received emails from individuals with Google email accounts.”  Compl. 
¶ 32. 
Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff has never had a Gmail account.  Id. ¶ 8.  However, due to the 
ubiquity of Gmail, Plaintiff has sent emails to and received emails from Gmail users, which 
Google allegedly has intercepted, scanned, and analyzed.  Id.  In particular, Plaintiff alleges that 
Google employs a variety of devices that, during the transmission of emails to and from Gmail 
accounts, intercept, scan, and analyze the content of emails.  For example, Google allegedly 
acquires and interprets the content of emails sent or received by Gmail users through “Content 
Onebox” and “Changeling,” which are “distinct piece[s] of Google’s infrastructure.”  Id. ¶ 19.  
Google then uses a process called “Nemo” to determine how to best monetize the data extracted 
from the intercepted emails.  Id. ¶ 20.  Plaintiff contends that these devices are “separate from the 
devices that are instrumental to sending and receiving email.”  Id. ¶ 2.   
Google allegedly uses the intercepted contents of Gmail messages for the “distinct 
purpose” of creating targeted advertisements and user profiles to be stored indefinitely.  Id. ¶¶ 21, 
28.  According to Plaintiff, Google utilizes the user profiles “for purposes of selling to paying 
customers, and sending to the profiled communicants, targeted advertising based upon analysis of 
these profiles.”  Id. ¶ 1; see also id. ¶ 17 (noting that Google “deliver[s] targeted advertisements 
based on these [user] profiles”).  Plaintiff allegedly did not consent to Google’s processing of 
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Plaintiff’s emails for these purposes.  Id. ¶¶ 3, 7, 8.   
B. Procedural History 
In light of the relationship between the instant case and Gmail, the Court briefly 
summarizes the relevant procedural history of Gmail in addition to the instant case. 
1. Procedural History of Gmail 
The first case that comprised the Gmail multi-district litigation, Dunbar v. Google, Inc., 
was filed on November 17, 2010 in the Eastern District of Texas.  See Dunbar v. Google, Inc., No. 
10-CV-00194, ECF No. 1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2010).  On June 27, 2012, upon Google’s motion, 
the case was transferred to the Northern District of California and assigned to the undersigned 
judge.  See Dunbar v. Google, Inc., No. 12-CV-03305, ECF No. 180 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2012).   
While Dunbar was pending, five other actions involving substantially similar allegations 
against Google were filed in this District and throughout the country.  See Scott v. Google, Inc. 
(“Scott I”), No. 12-CV-03413 (N.D. Cal.); Scott v. Google, Inc. (“Scott II”), No. 12-CV-00614 
(N.D. Fla.); A.K. v. Google, Inc., No. 12-CV-01179 (S.D. Ill.); Knowles v. Google, Inc., No. 12-
CV-02022 (D. Md.); Brinkman v. Google, Inc., No. 12-CV-00699 (E.D. Pa.).  On April 1, 2013, 
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued a Transfer Order, centralizing Dunbar along 
with the five other actions in the Northern District of California before the undersigned judge.  See 
No. 13-MD-02430, ECF No. 1.  The Court later related a seventh case to the multi-district 
litigation, Fread v. Google, Inc., No. 13-CV-01961 (N.D. Cal.).  See No. 13-MD-02430, ECF No. 
29. 
The Gmail plaintiffs filed a Consolidated Complaint on May 16, 2013.  No. 13-MD-02430, 
ECF No. 38.  That complaint attempted to state causes of action under (1) the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (the “ECPA” or the “Wiretap Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et 
seq.; (2) California’s Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code § 630 et seq.; (3) 
Maryland’s Wiretap Act, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402 et seq.; (4) Florida’s Wiretap 
Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 934.01 et seq.; and (5) Pennsylvania’s Wiretapping and Electronic 
Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5701 et seq.  Google filed a motion to dismiss the 
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Consolidated Complaint on June 13, 2013.  See No. 13-MD-02430, ECF No. 44.   
The Court granted in part and denied in part Google’s motion on September 26, 2013.  See 
No. 13-MD-02430, ECF No. 69.  As relevant here, the Court denied the motion to dismiss as to 
plaintiffs’ Wiretap Act claim.  Specifically, the Court rejected Google’s contention that any 
alleged interceptions fell within the “ordinary course” of Google’s business and were therefore 
exempt from anti-wiretapping statutes.  Using the tools of statutory interpretation, the Court 
concluded that the “ordinary course of business” exception was “narrow and designed only to 
protect electronic communication service providers against a finding of liability under the Wiretap 
Act where the interception facilitated or was incidental to provision of the electronic 
communication service at issue.”  Id. at 13–22.   
In addition, the Court rejected Google’s argument that all Gmail users had consented to the 
alleged interceptions based on Google’s terms of service and privacy policy.  The Court concluded 
that the terms of service and privacy policy did not provide sufficient disclosures to show that 
Gmail users had consented to the alleged interceptions.  Id. at 22–26.  The Court further rejected 
Google’s contention that all email users had impliedly consented to the alleged interceptions 
because all email users, including non-Gmail users, understand that such interceptions are part of 
how emails are transmitted.  Id. at 27–28.  
The Court also held that the Gmail plaintiffs could proceed on their claims under section 
631 of CIPA, California’s anti-wiretapping law.  Id. at 28–40.  The Court first found that section 
631 applies to email, not just to communications passing over telephone and telegraph wires, lines, 
or cables.  The Court also concluded that Google was not exempt from section 631 liability as a 
“public utility.”  Accordingly, the Court denied Google’s motion to dismiss the Gmail plaintiffs’ 
section 631 claim.   
On January 27, 2014, the Court denied Google’s motion to certify the Court’s order on the 
motion to dismiss for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Gmail, 2014 WL 294441, 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014).  The Court found that the long and tortured history of the Dunbar 
action and the consolidated multi-district litigation suggested that immediate appeal would not 
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materially advance the termination of the litigation.  Id.  The Court also noted that, regardless of 
the definition of the “ordinary course of business” exception under the Wiretap Act, further factual 
development would be necessary to determine whether the alleged interceptions of email fell 
within the “ordinary course” of Google’s business.  Id. at *3 n.2.   
On October 25, 2013, the Gmail plaintiffs moved for class certification of a damages class 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).  No. 13-MD-02430, ECF No. 87-26.  On March 
18, 2014, the Court denied class certification.  No. 13-MD-02430, ECF No. 158.  Specifically, the 
Court found that the Gmail plaintiffs had failed to meet the predominance requirement, which 
“tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by 
representation.”  Id.  The Court concluded that the question of whether the Gmail class members 
had consented to the alleged interceptions needed to be litigated on an individual rather than 
classwide basis.  The Court further concluded that the individualized inquiries into consent would 
predominate over questions common to the class and thus denied class certification.  On May 12, 
2014, the Ninth Circuit denied the Gmail plaintiffs’ petition for interlocutory review of the Court’s 
class certification order.  No. 13-MD-02430, ECF No. 174.   
After the Court’s order denying class certification, only the claims of individual plaintiffs 
remained in the Gmail litigation.  On May 23, 2014, the plaintiffs in Dunbar, Scott I, Scott II, 
Knowles, Brinkman, and Fread dismissed with prejudice their individual claims in the Gmail 
multidistrict litigation and in their original individual actions.  No. 13-MD-02430, ECF No. 175.  
On July 14, 2014, the plaintiffs in the last case remaining in the multidistrict litigation, A.K., 
dismissed with prejudice their individual claims in the Gmail multidistrict litigation and in their 
original individual action.  No. 13-MD-02430, ECF No. 177.   
2. Procedural History in the Instant Case 
Plaintiff filed the complaint on September 4, 2015.  ECF No. 1.  Like the Gmail plaintiffs, 
Plaintiff asserts violations of the ECPA and CIPA.  Plaintiff seeks to represent the following 
classes: 
CIPA Class (Count One): All persons in the State of California who have never 
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established an email account with Google, and who have sent emails to or 
received emails from individuals with Google email accounts. 
 
ECPA Class (Count Two): All persons in the United States who have never 
established an email account with Google, and who sent emails to or received 
emails from individuals with Google email accounts before December 19, 
2014. 
 
Id. ¶ 32.  On September 23, 2015, the case was related to Gmail and reassigned to the undersigned 
judge.  ECF No. 13.   
On October 29, 2015, Google filed the instant motion to dismiss, ECF No. 20 (“Mot.”), 
and a request for judicial notice, ECF No. 20-1 (“Google RJN”).  On December 4, 2015, Plaintiff 
opposed the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 29 (“Opp.”), and filed a request for judicial notice, ECF 
No. 31 (“Pl. RJN”).  Google replied on December 22, 2015.  ECF No. 33 (“Reply.”).   
The same day that Google filed the instant motion, Google also moved to temporarily stay 
the case pending the U.S. Supreme Court’s resolution of Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-01339.  
ECF No. 21.  Because this Court concluded that Spokeo may impact whether Plaintiff has standing 
to proceed in this action, this Court granted Google’s motion to stay on February 5, 2016.  ECF 
No. 36.  On April 28, 2016, this Court set a case management conference for May 25, 2016.  ECF 
No. 37.   
The U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion in Spokeo on May 16, 2016.  See Spokeo, Inc. 
v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).  At the May 25, 2016 case management conference, this Court 
lifted the stay in the instant case and ordered supplemental briefing as to the impact of Spokeo on 
Plaintiff’s standing.  ECF No. 40.  The parties filed simultaneous opening supplemental briefs on 
June 1, 2016.  ECF Nos. 41, 42.  The parties filed simultaneous reply supplemental briefs on June 
13, 2016.  ECF Nos. 45, 46.  This Court will address issues of standing, including the impact of 
Spokeo, in a separate order. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  A complaint 
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that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Rule 8(a) requires a 
plaintiff to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  “The plausibility 
standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
defendant has acted unlawfully.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations 
in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.”  Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).  The 
Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable facts, see 
Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look beyond the plaintiff’s 
complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion 
for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995).  Nor must the 
Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual 
allegations.”  Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  Mere 
“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to 
dismiss.”  Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004). 
B. Leave to Amend 
If the Court concludes that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether 
to grant leave to amend.  Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to 
amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose 
of Rule 15 . . . [is] to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or 
technicalities.”  Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (ellipsis in 
original).  Nonetheless, a district court may deny leave to amend a complaint due to “undue delay, 
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of 
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the amendment, and futility of amendment.”  See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 
522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (brackets omitted). 
III. JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Plaintiff and Google have each filed requests for judicial notice.  Under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 201(b), the Court can take judicial notice of any fact that is “not subject to reasonable 
dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.”  Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).  Under the doctrine of incorporation by 
reference, the Court also may consider documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint, 
provided that the complaint “necessarily relies” on the documents or contents thereof, the 
document’s authenticity is uncontested, and the document’s relevance is uncontested.  Coto 
Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). 
Plaintiff asks for judicial notice of the transcript of the November 2, 2015 oral argument 
before the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo, as well as a U.S. Senate Report regarding the passage of 
the ECPA.  See Pl. RJN.  Google requests judicial notice of Google’s public terms of service dated 
April 14, 2014; Google’s December 19, 2014 privacy policy, which is quoted in the complaint, as 
well as archived versions of the privacy policy; Google’s website entitled “Updates: Privacy 
Policy”; two reports from California Senate Committees; and three bills introduced in the 
California Legislature.  See Google RJN.  Both Plaintiff’s and Google’s requests for judicial 
notice are unopposed, and the documents therein are the proper subject of judicial notice.  See 
Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Legislative history is properly a 
subject of judicial notice.”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (matters 
of public record), overruled in part on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 
F.3d 119, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 2006 WL 618511, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
13, 2006) (publicly accessible websites).  Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s and 
Google’s unopposed requests for judicial notice. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
Google moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under: (1) the Electronic Communications 
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Privacy Act of 1986 (the “ECPA” or “Wiretap Act”), 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., and (2) 
California’s Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”), Cal. Penal Code § 630 et seq.  As to the Wiretap 
Act, Google claims that the alleged interception, scanning, and analysis of email falls within the 
“ordinary course of business” exception to liability.  Google also requests certification of an 
interlocutory appeal on this issue to the Ninth Circuit.  As to CIPA, Google asks the Court to 
decline supplemental jurisdiction and contends that CIPA does not apply to electronic 
communications like email.  The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s Wiretap Act claim then 
Plaintiff’s CIPA claim. 
A. Wiretap Act 
1. Ordinary Course of Business 
The Wiretap Act generally prohibits the interception of “wire, oral, or electronic 
communication[s]” through the use of “any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(1).  In the instant case, Plaintiff contends that Google violated the Wiretap Act in its 
operation of the Gmail system by intentionally intercepting the content of emails in order to create 
user profiles and to provide targeted advertising.  Google counters that Plaintiff has not stated a 
claim with respect to the Wiretap Act because the alleged interceptions fall within the “ordinary 
course of business” exception to the definition of “any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”  
Under that exception, “any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any 
component thereof . . . being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the 
ordinary course of its business” is not a “device,” and the use of such an instrument is not 
prohibited by the Wiretap Act.  Id. § 2510(5)(a)(ii).   
Specifically, Google contends that any interception of Plaintiff’s emails occurred in the 
ordinary course of Google’s business.  Google asks the Court to reconsider Gmail, which held that 
the “ordinary course of business” exception “offers protection from liability only where an 
electronic communication service provider’s interception facilitates the transmission of the 
communication at issue or is incidental to the transmission of such communication.”  Gmail, 2013 
WL 5423918, at *8.  The Court first addresses the “ordinary course of business” exception and 
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Gmail’s interpretation of that exception, then addresses Google’s challenge to that interpretation.  
As noted above, the Wiretap Act prohibits the interception of “wire, oral, or electronic 
communication[s]” through the use of “any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(1).  Specifically, a Wiretap Act violation exists when any person “intentionally intercepts, 
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, 
oral, or electronic communication.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a); see also id. § 2520 (creating a private 
right of action for violations of § 2511).  The Wiretap Act defines “intercept” as “the aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any 
electronic, mechanical, or other device.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).  However, the definition of 
“electronic, mechanical, or other device” excludes devices: 
(i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic 
communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the 
subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such 
subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the 
ordinary course of its business; or 
(ii) being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the 
ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in 
the ordinary course of his duties; 
Id. § 2510(5)(a).  Accordingly, the Wiretap Act includes two “ordinary course of business” 
exceptions.  The first, under subsection (a)(i), is for users or subscribers of electronic 
communication services while the second, subsection (a)(ii), applies to the providers of electronic 
communication services.  This case implicates the latter, as Google provides the electronic 
communication service at issue here, Gmail. 
The Ninth Circuit has not yet ruled on the scope of the “ordinary course of business” 
exception in subsection (a)(ii).  In Gmail, however, the Court analyzed subsection (a)(ii) and 
rejected Google’s contention that any interception of email in that case fell within the “ordinary 
course” of Google’s business.  Analyzing the text of the statute, the statutory scheme, case law, 
and legislative history, the Court concluded that the ordinary course of business exception 
protected electronic communication service providers from liability where the interceptions 
“facilitated or [were] incidental to provision of the electronic communication service at issue.”  
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Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *11.  In other words, the Court concluded that there “must be some 
nexus between the need to engage in the alleged interception and the [provider’s] ultimate 
business, that is, the ability to provide the underlying service or good.”  Id.  
The Court then found that the Gmail plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that there was no 
nexus between Google’s provision of Gmail and the alleged interception and scanning of email for 
advertising purposes.  The Court noted that the Gmail plaintiffs alleged that Google’s 
interceptions of email were “for Google’s own benefit in other Google services unrelated to the 
service of email or the particular user” and thus “the alleged interception of emails at issue here is 
both physically and purposively unrelated to Google’s provision of email services.”  Id. (brackets 
omitted). 
In the instant case, similar to Gmail, Plaintiff alleges that Google intercepts, scans, and 
analyzes Plaintiff’s in-transit email for Google’s commercial purposes.  Google concedes that the 
processing of emails alleged here is not within the “ordinary course of business” exception as 
interpreted by the Court in Gmail.  However, Google asks the Court to reconsider Gmail.  
Specifically, Google challenges the Gmail Court’s interpretation of: (1) the plain meaning of the 
Wiretap Act, (2) applicable case law, and (3) the statutory scheme.  In addition, Google argues 
that, under the Gmail interpretation, the alleged interception, scanning, and analysis of email in the 
instant case has a sufficient nexus to Google’s business to fall within the “ordinary course of 
business” exception.  The Court addresses these challenges in turn.   
a. Plain Meaning 
Google contends that the plain meaning of the “ordinary course of business” exception 
must encompass more than the conduct necessary to the transmission of an electronic 
communication.  Relying on two dictionaries, Google defines “ordinary” as “normal” or “usual” 
and “business” as “the activity of making, buying, or selling goods or providing services in 
exchange for money.”  Mot. at 9.  Based on these definitions, Google contends that Google “need 
only show that its Gmail-related practices are supported by a legitimate or valid business purpose 
in order to take advantage of the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception.”  Id. at 10, 14.   
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The Court disagrees.  As the Court stated in Gmail, “the presence of the modifier 
‘ordinary’ must mean that not everything Google does in the course of its business would fall 
within the exception.”  Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *8.  Thus, not every practice that is routine 
or legitimate will fall within the scope of the “ordinary course of business.”  See id.  To give effect 
to the word “ordinary,” the Court in Gmail concluded that the “ordinary course of business” 
exception applies when there is “some nexus between the need to engage in the alleged 
interception and the [provider’s] ultimate business, that is, the ability to provide the underlying 
service or good.”  Id. at *11.   
Following Gmail, Chief Judge Phyllis Hamilton of this district analyzed the “ordinary 
course of business” exception and adopted the same “nexus” requirement as Gmail.  Campbell v. 
Facebook Inc., 77 F. Supp. 3d 836, 844 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  In the instant motion, Google contends 
that Chief Judge Hamilton adopted a unique view of the “ordinary course of business” exception.  
Mot. at 17–18; Reply at 11.  Upon review of Campbell, however, the Court finds no support for 
Google’s position.  Chief Judge Hamilton specifically “agree[d] with the Gmail court’s finding 
that there must be ‘some nexus between the need to engage in the alleged interception and the 
subscriber’s ultimate business, that is, the ability to provide the underlying service or good.’”  
Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 844.  In addition, like this Court in Gmail, Chief Judge Hamilton 
found that the defendant in that case failed to “indicate a nexus between [the defendant’s] alleged 
scanning of users’ private messages for advertising purposes and its ability to provide its service.”  
Id.   
Moreover, Chief Judge Hamilton rejected an interpretation similar to the one offered by 
Google here.  As Chief Judge Hamilton explained, “the statute’s inclusion of the word ‘ordinary’ 
implies some limits on a company’s ability to self-define the scope of the exception.  An 
electronic communications service provider cannot simply adopt any revenue-generating practice 
and deem it ‘ordinary’ by its own subjective standard.”  Id.  If it were otherwise, an electronic 
communication service provider could claim that any activity routinely undertaken for a business 
purpose is within the ordinary course of business, no matter how unrelated the activity is to the 
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provision of the electronic communication service.  See id.  As Chief Judge Hamilton noted, such 
a reading of the “ordinary course of business” exception is untenable, and would permit electronic 
communication service providers to effectively exempt themselves from the Wiretap Act.  See id.   
The reading of the “ordinary course of business” exception adopted in Gmail and 
Campbell is supported by examining the full text of the “ordinary course of business” exception, 
which exempts from interception any devices “being used by a provider of wire or electronic 
communication service in the ordinary course of its business.”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii) 
(emphases added).  This phrase suggests that Google’s exemption from the Wiretap Act’s 
prohibition on interception is limited to “its” business as “a provider of . . . electronic 
communication service.”  Id.; see also Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 844 (noting that the “use of the 
word ‘its’ indicates that the court must consider the details of [the electronic communication 
provider’s] business”).  The interpretation of the “ordinary course of business” exception adopted 
in Gmail and Campbell, which requires “some nexus between the need to engage in the alleged 
interception and the [provider’s] ultimate business, that is, the ability to provide the underlying 
service or good,” thus gives effect to the word “ordinary” as well as to the business of the 
electronic communication service provider.   
This Court is not persuaded otherwise by Google’s citation to In re Google, Inc. Privacy 
Policy Litigation (“Google Privacy”), 2013 WL 6248499 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013).  In Google 
Privacy, the plaintiffs challenged the introduction of a new Google privacy policy that permitted 
the combination of personal information collected from different Google services—Google search, 
Gmail, YouTube, Google Maps, Picasa, etc.—in order to create a single user profile.  The 
plaintiffs alleged that this commingling violated the Wiretap Act, and Google moved to dismiss on 
the basis of the “ordinary course of business” exception.  In Google Privacy, former U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Paul Grewal rejected a “narrow read” of the exception that would be “limited to 
only action taken to deliver the electronic communication.”  Id. at *10.  Instead, Magistrate Judge 
Grewal found that “Congress specifically chose the broader term ‘business’ that covers more 
farranging activity.”  Id.  Magistrate Judge Grewal also stated that Congress’s pairing of the term 
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“business” with the terms “ordinary course” further “suggest[ed] an interest in protecting a 
provider’s customary and routine business practices.”  Id.  Accordingly, Magistrate Judge Grewal 
found that “the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception is not limited to actions necessary to 
providing the electronic communication services.”  Id.  
The Court respectfully disagrees with Google Privacy.  As this Court found in Gmail and 
Chief Judge Hamilton found in Campbell, the plain meaning of the text of the exception requires a 
different reading of the “ordinary course of business.”  Magistrate Judge Grewal’s reading of the 
“ordinary course of business” exception to encompass any customary and routine business 
practice, regardless of the nexus to the electronic communication service, gives too little weight to 
the word “ordinary” as well as to the electronic service provider’s particular business.  See 
Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 844; Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *8.  In addition, such a reading 
permits an electronic communication service provider like Google to unilaterally adopt any 
revenue-generating business practice, deem it “routine,” and exempt itself from the Wiretap Act.  
As Chief Judge Hamilton noted, it is untenable for electronic communication service providers to 
“self-define” the scope of their exemption from Wiretap Act liability.  See Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 
3d at 844.  Thus, Magistrate Judge Grewal’s interpretation of the “ordinary course of business” 
exception is not supported by the text’s plain meaning.   
Moreover, the Court in Gmail and in the instant case exhaustively addresses applicable 
case law as well as the statutory scheme.  By contrast, Magistrate Judge Grewal’s Google Privacy 
ruling does not mention the statutory scheme and relies on only two cases construing the “ordinary 
course of business” exception, Kirch v. Embarq Management Co., 702 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2012), 
and Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2005).  The Court in Gmail and in the 
instant case extensively analyzes both Kirch and Hall, and finds that these cases support the Gmail 
and Campbell courts’ interpretation of the “ordinary course of business” exception.  Further, the 
Court in Gmail and in the instant case finds that additional case law and the statutory scheme—not 
addressed by Magistrate Judge Grewal in Google Privacy—support the Gmail and Campbell 
courts’ interpretation of the “ordinary course of business” exception.  Kirch, Hall, additional 
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applicable case law, and the statutory scheme are discussed further in sections IV.A.1.b–d below. 
In sum, under the plain meaning of the Wiretap Act, the “ordinary course of business” 
exception protects an electronic communication service provider’s interception of email where 
there is “some nexus between the need to engage in the alleged interception and the [provider’s] 
ultimate business, that is, the ability to provide the underlying service or good.”  Gmail, 2013 WL 
5423918, at *11.  The Court next addresses the case law supporting this interpretation of the 
“ordinary course of business” exception. 
b. Applicable Case Law: Kirch and Hall 
Google contends that two cases support reading the “ordinary course of business” 
exception to encompass all of an electronic communication service provider’s routine business 
practices: Kirch v. Embarq Management Co., 702 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2012), and Hall v. 
Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2005).  This Court relied on both of these cases in 
Gmail to conclude that not all interceptions of email by an electronic communication service 
provider fall within the “ordinary course of business” exception.   
In Kirch, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Embarq, an 
ISP, where Embarq had intercepted only data incidental to its provision of the internet service.  In 
that case, Embarq placed a device on its servers that redirected users’ Internet traffic to a third-
party company, NebuAd, which tracked the websites that Embarq’s users visited and used that 
information to target ads.  702 F.3d at 1247.  The Tenth Circuit held that Embarq had not violated 
the Wiretap Act because the ISP could not be liable for NebuAd’s interceptions.  Id. at 1249.  
Further, Embarq itself did not review any of the raw data that NebuAd collected.  Id. at 1250.  
Rather, Embarq had “access to no more of its users’ electronic communications” than Embarq 
necessarily had as an ISP.  Id.  Because Embarq’s ordinary course of business as an ISP required 
Embarq to have access to data that was transmitted over its equipment, the Tenth Circuit 
concluded that “Embarq’s access [to the data] was in the ordinary course of its core business as an 
ISP transmitting data over its equipment.”  Id. at 1249–50 (emphasis added).  In Gmail, the Court 
found that “Kirch stands only for the narrow proposition that interceptions incidental to the 
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provision of the alleged interceptor’s internet service fall within the ‘ordinary course of business’ 
exception.”  Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *8.   
Google counters that the “ordinary course of business” exception as interpreted by Kirch 
exempts all of an ISP’s routine and legitimate business practices from the Wiretap Act.  According 
to Google, the Tenth Circuit found that Embarq’s interception of user data fell within Embarq’s 
“ordinary course of business” even though Embarq “extracted a subset of the data for purposes of 
delivering targeted advertisements.”  Mot. at 13.  However, Google misreads Kirch.  Embarq did 
not extract any user data for purposes of delivering targeted advertisements.  Indeed, it was crucial 
to the Tenth Circuit’s analysis that “the only access Embarq had to the data extracted by NebuAd 
was in its capacity as an ISP, not because of any special relationship with NebuAd or the 
[extraction of data by NebuAd].”  Kirch, 702 F.3d at 1249 (emphasis added).  
Further, the Tenth Circuit construed the “ordinary course of business” exception to apply 
only to interceptions incidental to the provision of the internet service: “Embarq’s access was in 
the ordinary course of its core business as an ISP transmitting data over its equipment” and “in the 
ordinary course of providing Internet services as an ISP.”  Id. at 1246, 1249 (emphases added).  
The Tenth Circuit did not mention the reasoning of the district court below, which did not reach 
the issue of Embarq’s “ordinary course of business” defense but nonetheless stated in dicta that the 
defense “appears to have merit” because Embarq’s actions “further legitimate business purposes 
and . . . behavioral advertising is a widespread business and is commonplace on the Internet.”  See 
Kirch, 2011 WL 3651359, at *9 n.42 (D. Kan. Aug. 19, 2011).  Instead, the Tenth Circuit focused 
on Embarq’s provision of a communication service and—as this Court did in Gmail—analyzed 
whether the alleged interception facilitated or was incidental to Embarq’s provision of that service.  
See Kirch, 702 F.3d at 1249 (noting that “Embarq’s access was in the ordinary course of its core 
business as an ISP transmitting data over its equipment” (emphasis added)).  Accordingly, Kirch 
“stands only for the narrow proposition that interceptions incidental to the provision of the alleged 
interceptor’s internet service fall within the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception.”  Gmail, 2013 
WL 5423918, at *8.   
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In the second case relied upon by Google, Hall, the plaintiff had a dispute with his ISP, 
Earthlink, that resulted in the termination of the plaintiff’s email account.  However, Earthlink 
continued to receive emails that were sent to the user’s address even after the termination, and the 
user complained that the receipt of email constituted an unlawful “interception” under the Wiretap 
Act.  Hall, 396 F.3d at 502.  The Second Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Earthlink because Earthlink’s continued receipt of emails was within the ordinary course of 
business.  Id. at 505.  The Second Circuit noted that Earthlink “used its routers, servers and other 
computer equipment as part of its e-mail service to all customers, including [plaintiff].”  Id.  In 
addition, Earthlink presented testimony that Earthlink routinely continued to receive and store 
emails after an account was canceled and more critically that Earthlink “did not have the ability to 
bounce e-mail back to senders after the termination of an account.”  Id.  Accordingly, the alleged 
interceptions in Hall were an incidental part of Earthlink’s ability to provide email services.   
Google interprets Hall to apply the “ordinary course of business” exception to any standard 
business practice, whether or not the practice is necessary to providing the electronic 
communication service.  Mot. at 12.  Hall, however, does not support Google’s argument.  As 
stated above, the Second Circuit noted that the devices used to “intercept” the plaintiff’s email 
were the same as those “used . . . as part of [Earthlink’s] e-mail service to all customers.”  Hall, 
396 F.3d at 505.  Moreover, the Second Circuit specifically noted that Earthlink “did not have the 
ability to bounce e-mail back to senders after the termination of an account.”  Id. (expressing 
concern that ISPs would be liable for provision of “their basic services”).  These statements 
demonstrate that the Second Circuit relied upon the fact that Earthlink’s receipt of Plaintiff’s email 
was part of and incidental to Earthlink’s provision of email services.   
In both Kirch and Hall, the only information to which the defendant ISPs had access was 
collected by the devices that provided internet or email services.  Kirch, 702 F.3d at 1250; Hall, 
396 F.3d at 505.  By contrast, Plaintiff here alleges that Google used devices “separate from the 
devices that are instrumental to sending and receiving email” to intercept, scan, and analyze the 
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putative class’s emails.2  Compl. ¶¶ 1, 19, 22–23.  Thus, Google is thus less like Embarq or 
Earthlink and more akin to NebuAd, the third party in Kirch that intercepted data for the purpose 
of providing targeted advertising—a purpose separate and apart from the provision of internet 
service.  Cf. Kirch, 702 F.3d at 1248.  Because NebuAd settled with the plaintiffs in Kirch, the 
Tenth Circuit’s opinion does not deal with NebuAd’s liability.  Id. at 1248 n.2, 1249 (“[W]e need 
not address whether NebuAd intercepted any of the Kirches’ electronic communications.”).  
However, both Kirch and Hall exempted ISPs from liability where the alleged interceptions were 
incidental to the provision of the ISP’s internet or email service.  Accordingly, the Court finds that 
Kirch and Hall support the Court’s construction of the “ordinary course of business” exception in 
Gmail, which found that the exception applies “only where an electronic communication service 
provider’s interception facilitates the transmission of the communication at issue or is incidental to 
the transmission of such communication.”  Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *8.   
c. Applicable Case Law: Cases Interpreting § 2510(5)(a)(i) of the Wiretap Act 
In addition to challenging the Court’s interpretation of Kirch and Hall, Google takes issue 
with the citations in Gmail to decisions construing the “ordinary course of business” exception of 
§ 2510(5)(a)(i), which applies to users and subscribers of electronic communication services.  
Mot. at 13–14.  By contrast, as noted above, Google is covered by subsection (a)(ii), which applies 
to electronic communication service providers.  Google contends that the “far different context of 
the[] cases” interpreting subsection (a)(i) limits their relevance, and, regardless, that the subsection 
                                                 
2
 On April 30, 2014, Google ceased intercepting, scanning, and analyzing, for advertising 
purposes, the contents of emails transmitted via Google Apps for Education.  See Corley v. 
Google, Inc., 16-CV-00473-LHK, ECF No. 73 at 17 (N.D. Cal.) (statement of Google).  
Accordingly, it appears that Google is able to provide the Gmail service without intercepting, 
scanning, and analyzing the content of email for advertising purposes.   
  The Court takes judicial notice of the transcript of the April 20, 2016 case management 
conference in Corley, in which Google confirmed the termination of the intercepting, scanning, 
and analyzing, for advertising purposes, of emails transmitted via Google Apps for Education.  In 
that case, also related to Gmail, the plaintiffs are users of Google Apps for Education who allege 
that Google unlawfully intercepted, scanned, and analyzed their email for advertising purposes and 
without consent.  No. 16-CV-00473, ECF No. 19.  Lawyers representing Plaintiff and Google in 
the instant case also represent the respective parties in Corley.  Moreover, the Court may take 
judicial notice of public court records.  See Lee, 250 F.3d at 688. 
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(a)(i) cases do not support the reading of the “ordinary course of business” exception adopted in 
Gmail.   
In Gmail, the Court noted that in the context of subsection (a)(i), “courts have held, 
consistent with the textual limitation that ‘ordinary’ imposes on ‘course of business,’ that not 
everything that a company may want to do falls within the ‘ordinary course of business’ 
exception.”  Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *8.  This reading of the “ordinary course of business” 
exception is clearly supported by the cases cited in Gmail.  See Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 
F.2d 577, 582 (11th Cir. 1983) (“The phrase ‘in the ordinary course of business’ cannot be 
expanded to mean anything that interests a company.”); Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 
980, 984 (6th Cir. 2001) (providing that the “ordinary course of business” requires that a device’s 
use be “for a legitimate business purpose,” “routine,” and “with notice”); Arias v. Mut. Cent. 
Alarm Serv., Inc., 202 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding ordinary course of business exception 
applied when “[l]egitimate business reasons” supported the challenged activity); Berry v. Funk, 
146 F.3d 1003, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that the challenged business practice must “be 
justified by a valid business purpose” or “at least must be shown to be undertaken normally”).   
Google, by contrast, reads the subsection (a)(i) cases to define “ordinary” as “legitimate” 
and “routine,” and thus contends that routine business practices justified by a business purpose fall 
within the “ordinary course of business.”  However, as the Court explained in Gmail, the 
subsection (a)(i) cases suggest that a business practice is “legitimate” (and thus within the 
“ordinary course of business”) only when there is “some nexus between the need to engage in the 
alleged interception and the subscriber’s ultimate business, that is, the ability to provide the 
underlying service or good.”  Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *11.  For example, in Arias, the 
Second Circuit found that it was within an alarm company’s ordinary course of business to record 
all incoming and outgoing calls because maintaining records of the calls was instrumental “to 
ensure that [the alarm company’s] personnel are not divulging sensitive customer information, that 
events are reported quickly to emergency services, that customer claims regarding events are 
verifiable, and that the police and other authorities may rely on these records in conducting any 
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investigations.”  202 F.3d at 559 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).   
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit addressed an employer’s installation of a telephone monitoring 
device on the phone lines in departments where employees interacted with the public.  James v. 
Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979).  The Tenth Circuit concluded that such 
activity was within the employer’s ordinary course of business because of “concern by 
management over abusive language used by irate customers when called upon to pay their bills, 
coupled with the possible need to give further training and supervision to employees dealing with 
the public.”  Id. at 581.  In other words, both the Second and Tenth Circuits analyzed whether a 
nexus existed between the challenged interception and the defendant’s business. 
As another example, in Watkins, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a situation in which an 
employer listened in on an employee’s personal phone call wherein the employee discussed a job 
interview.  The Eleventh Circuit held that an employer could only listen to an employee’s phone 
call for the purpose of determining whether a call is for personal or business purposes, and thus 
the employer “was obliged to cease listening as soon as she had determined that the call was 
personal, regardless of the contents of the legitimately heard conversation.”  Watkins, 704 F.2d at 
584.  Applying that principle, the Eleventh Circuit found that the alleged interception was not 
within the employer’s ordinary course of business even though the conversation was “obviously of 
interest and concern to [the employer].”  Id. at 582–83.   
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit in Berry rejected “the general principle that any call whose 
subject is business, if monitored, is necessarily done in the ordinary course of business even if not 
authorized by a company monitoring policy and not known to employees.”  Berry, 146 F.3d at 
1009.  Thus, examining the facts of the subsection (a)(i) cases reveals that an employer’s 
interception of communications falls within the “ordinary course of business” only when the 
interception has a nexus to the defendant’s ability to provide the underlying service, not when the 
interceptions serve any conceivable business purpose.  This limitation, applied to electronic 
communication service providers in the context of subsection (a)(ii), means that the “ordinary 
course of business” exception applies if the electronic communication service provider 
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“demonstrate[s] the interception facilitated the communication service or was incidental to the 
functioning of the provided communication service.”3  Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *8. 
d. Statutory Scheme 
Google next challenges Gmail’s interpretation of the statutory scheme.  The Court in 
Gmail highlighted another provision of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i), which 
provides protection for individual employees of a communication service provider.  This section 
provides: 
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an 
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication 
service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic 
communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal 
course of his employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary 
incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the rights or property 
of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire communication 
service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring 
except for mechanical or service quality control checks. 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).  Google points out that the Court in Gmail 
erroneously stated that the limitation in this section on the use of “service observing or random 
monitoring” applies to electronic communication service providers, when this limitation applies 
only to wire communication service providers.  See Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *9.  However, 
the distinction between wire and electronic communication service providers in this section is less 
important than the distinction between activities that are, or are not, incidental to the provision of 
the communication service.  This second distinction is reflected in the ECPA’s legislative history: 
In applying the second clause only to wire communications, this provision reflects 
an important technical distinction between electronic communications and 
traditional voice telephone service.  The provider of electronic communications 
                                                 
3
 The Court notes that the subsection (a)(i) cases address when interception is within the ordinary 
course of an electronic communication service user’s ordinary course of business.  See, e.g., Arias, 
202 F.3d at 559 (discussing ordinary course of business of an alarm company); Berry, 146 F.3d at 
1005–06, 1010 (discussing the business practice of the State Department operations center in 
monitoring telephone calls).  By contrast, the subsection applicable to electronic communication 
service providers like Google, subsection (a)(ii), refers to the electronic communication service 
provider’s ordinary course of business.  Kirch and Hall, discussed above, analyzed subsection 
(a)(ii).  Both Kirch and Hall stand for the proposition that interceptions that facilitated or were 
incidental to the provision of the electronic communication service fall within the “ordinary course 
of business” exception.   
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services may have to monitor a stream of transmissions in order to properly route, 
terminate, and otherwise manage the individual messages they contain.  These 
monitoring functions, which may be necessary to the provision of an electronic 
communication service, do not involve humans listening in on voice conversations.  
Accordingly, they are not prohibited.  In contrast, the traditional limits on service 
“observing” and random “monitoring” do refer to human aural interceptions and 
are retained with respect to voice or “wire” communications. 
Pl. RJN Ex. B, at 20.  As the Court noted in Gmail, this legislative history “suggests that Congress 
intended to protect electronic communication service providers from liability when the providers 
were monitoring communications for the purposes of ensuring that the providers could 
appropriately route, terminate, and manage messages.”  Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *10.  It does 
not suggest that Congress intended to provide protection from liability for any interception that 
benefits an electronic communication service provider’s business model.  Accordingly, the Court 
finds that § 2511(2)(a)(i) supports interpreting the “ordinary course of business” exception in 
§ 2510(5)(a)(ii) to require an electronic communication service provider to “show some link 
between the alleged interceptions at issue and its ability to operate the communication system.”  
Id.  
In sum, having considered Google’s arguments, the Court concludes that the Court’s 
interpretation of the “ordinary course of business” exception in Gmail is correct.  The plain 
language of the “ordinary course of business” exception, the applicable case law, and the statutory 
scheme do not support reading the “ordinary course of business” exception to apply to any 
interceptions that serve any conceivable business purpose.  Rather, the exception offers protection 
from liability “only where an electronic communication service provider’s interception facilitates 
the transmission of the communication at issue or is incidental to the transmission of such 
communication” and there is “some nexus between the need to engage in the alleged interception 
and the [provider’s] ultimate business, that is, the ability to provide the underlying service or 
good.”  Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *8, *11.   
e. Existence of a Nexus 
Assuming that Gmail’s interpretation of the “ordinary course of business” exception 
applies, Google contends that there is a nexus between the interceptions alleged here and Google’s 
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ability to provide Gmail.  According to Google, the alleged interception of email enables Google 
to provide targeted advertising, which in turn generates the revenue necessary for Google to 
provide Gmail.  Mot. at 15.  Google further contends that “the use of data to target ads is routine 
and legitimate commercial behavior.”  Id. 
On a motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true 
and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”  Manzarek, 519 
F.3d at 1031.  Plaintiff alleges that Google intercepts emails for purposes of creating user profiles 
and targeting advertising through “distinct piece[s] of Google’s infrastructure” that are “separate 
from the devices that are instrumental to sending and receiving email.”  Compl. ¶¶ 2, 19.  Plaintiff 
further alleges that Google “intercepts Gmail for the distinct purpose of acquiring and retaining 
user data and creating targeted advertising,” which is separate from “the functioning of the 
provided communication service.”  Id. ¶ 28.  Taking the foregoing as true, Plaintiff plausibly 
alleges that Google’s alleged interceptions neither facilitate the provision of email services, nor are 
they an incidental effect of providing these services.  Thus, at the motion to dismiss stage, the 
Court can not say that Google’s alleged interception of email is within the “ordinary course of 
business” as a matter of law.   
Moreover, on April 30, 2014, Google ceased intercepting, scanning, and analyzing, for 
advertising purposes, the contents of emails transmitted via Google Apps for Education.  See 
Corley, 16-CV-00473-LHK, ECF No. 73 at 17 (statement of Google).  Accordingly, Google is 
able to provide the Gmail service to at least some users without intercepting, scanning, and 
analyzing the content of email for advertising purposes.  This strongly suggests that the alleged 
interception, scanning, and analysis of email neither facilitates nor is incidental to the provision of 
Google’s electronic communication service.  Plaintiff plausibly alleges that Google’s alleged 
interceptions of email are outside of the ordinary course of Google’s business.   
For the reasons stated above, Google’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Wiretap Act claim is 
DENIED.  See Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *11 (denying motion to dismiss when “the alleged 
interception of emails at issue here is both physically and purposively unrelated to Google’s 
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provision of email services”); Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 844 (denying motion to dismiss when 
“the court cannot find any facts alleged in the complaint or facts presented by Facebook that 
indicate a nexus between Facebook’s alleged scanning of users’ private messages for advertising 
purposes and its ability to provide its service”); Dunbar v. Google, Inc., 2011 WL 12907501, at *4 
(E.D. Tex. May 23, 2011) (“The applicability of the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception 
therefore cannot be resolved at the pleading stage.”).   
2. Interlocutory Appeal 
Should the Court deny Google’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Wiretap Act claim, Google 
asks the Court to certify the following question to the Ninth Circuit: “Whether Google’s 
automated scanning of emails in providing Google services falls within the ‘ordinary course of its 
business’ exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(a)(ii), to the Wiretap Act.”  Mot. at 16.  The Court may, in 
its discretion, certify an interlocutory order for appellate review when the Court is of “the opinion 
that such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for 
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the 
ultimate termination of the litigation.”  28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  Section 1292(b) “is a departure from 
the normal rule that only final judgments are appealable, and therefore must be construed 
narrowly.”  James v. Price Stern Sloan, Inc., 283 F.3d 1064, 1067 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002); see also In 
re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he legislative history of 
1292(b) indicates that this section was to be used only in exceptional situations in which allowing 
an interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and expensive litigation.”).   
The Court finds that Google has not established the exceptional circumstances necessary to 
“invoke the narrow exception to the final judgment rule embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).”  
Couch v. Telescope Inc., 611 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2010).  First, the question that Google seeks 
to certify is not a purely legal one.  Rather, additional factual development is necessary as to how 
Google scanned email as well as how the alleged interceptions relate to Google’s provision of 
Gmail.  As the Court noted in denying Google’s motion to certify an interlocutory appeal in 
Gmail, “[r]egardless of which definition [of the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception] is 
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adopted, the Court finds that factual development would be necessary in determining whether 
Google’s interceptions fall within the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception.  For example, the 
Court cannot determine based on the pleadings alone what is ‘necessary,’ ‘customary or routine,’ 
or ‘instrumental’ to Google’s business.”  Gmail, 2014 WL 294441, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 
2014).  Consequently, “[a]n interlocutory appeal prior to any discovery would deprive the 
appellate court of a factual record that likely would aid its consideration of the legal questions 
presented.”  See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 2008 WL 4790669, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 
2008).  Moreover, while Google seeks to certify the question of whether the “automated scanning 
of emails in providing Google services falls within the ‘ordinary course of its business’ 
exception,” a proper question for interlocutory appeal “must be stated at a high enough level of 
abstraction to lift the question out of the details of the evidence of facts of a particular case.”  
Sateriale v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co., 2015 WL 3767424, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2015).  These 
factors weigh against granting interlocutory appeal.  See id.; Lenz, 2008 WL 4790669, at *7. 
Second, the Court finds that an immediate appeal will not materially advance the ultimate 
termination of this litigation but rather will delay resolution of this case.  Even if Google were to 
prevail on appeal on the issue for which Google seeks certification, Plaintiff’s CIPA claim will 
need to be litigated.  Plaintiff’s CIPA claim is premised on the same alleged intercepting, 
scanning, and analyzing of email underlying Plaintiff’s Wiretap Act claim, and will require the 
parties to engage in very similar discovery.  Consequently, “an interlocutory appeal will not allow 
the parties to avoid protracted litigation [but] will simply create the prospect of two separate 
appeals.”  Wadler v. Bio-Rad Labs., Inc., 2015 WL 8753292, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2015); see 
also Sonoda v. Amerisave Mortg. Corp., 2011 WL 3957436, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011) 
(“When litigation will be conducted in substantially the same manner regardless of our decision, 
the appeal cannot be said to materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”).   
Moreover, if Google were truly concerned about receiving a ruling from the Ninth Circuit 
on the scope of the “ordinary course of business” exception, Google could have chosen to litigate 
and appeal any of the individual cases in Gmail.  The Court denied class certification in Gmail on 
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March 18, 2014, leaving only individual claims remaining.  That ruling was over two years ago.  
Had Google chosen to litigate any of the individual claims in Gmail through appeal, Google likely 
would have received a ruling from the Ninth Circuit by now.  Instead, Google and all the 
individual plaintiffs stipulated to dismissals with prejudice by July 14, 2014.  No. 13-MD-02430, 
ECF Nos. 175, 177.  Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that exceptional circumstances exist 
to delay the instant litigation in order for Google to appeal an issue that Google could have 
appealed two years ago. 
Because Google has failed to show a “controlling question of law” on which an immediate 
appeal “may materially advance the ultimate termination of litigation,” certification of an 
interlocutory appeal is improper and the Court need not determine whether there is “substantial 
ground for difference of opinion.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  For the reasons discussed above, and 
respecting the high bar imposed for interlocutory appeal, the Court sees no reason to view the 
instant issue as an “exceptional situation[]” warranting interlocutory appeal.  In re Cement 
Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d at 1026; see also U.S. Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 
1966) (noting that § 1292(b) “was not intended merely to provide review of difficult rulings in 
hard cases”).  The Court DENIES Google’s motion to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth 
Circuit. 
B. CIPA 
Google moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s CIPA claim on two grounds: (1) the Court should 
decline supplemental jurisdiction; and (2) section 631 of CIPA does not apply to email 
communications and thus does not apply to the conduct alleged here.  The Court addresses these 
arguments respectively. 
1. Supplemental Jurisdiction 
 Where a federal court has original jurisdiction over a claim, the court has supplemental 
jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within [the court’s] 
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the 
United States Constitution.”  28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also Trs. of Constr. Indus. & Laborers 
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Health & Welfare Tr. v. Desert Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 
2003) (upholding the constitutionality of supplemental jurisdiction).  Nonfederal claims are part of 
the same “case” as federal claims when they “derive from a common nucleus of operative [facts] 
and are such that a plaintiff ‘would ordinarily be expected to try them in one judicial proceeding.’”  
Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989) (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 
383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Exxon Mobil Corp. 
v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558 (2005).  A district court has the discretion to decline 
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection 1367(a) if: (1) the claim raises a novel or complex 
issue of state law; (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 
district court has original jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it 
has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons 
for declining jurisdiction.  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).  The district court’s discretion to decline 
supplemental jurisdiction is informed by the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and 
comity.  Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. 
 Google does not contest that Plaintiff’s CIPA claim is “part of the same case or 
controversy” as Plaintiff’s federal Wiretap Act claim and thus that supplemental jurisdiction is 
proper.  However, Google asks the Court to exercise its discretion to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s CIPA claim “raise[s] a novel or complex issue of State law” that 
California courts have not addressed.  Mot. at 18–20 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)).4  Google 
specifically points to a lack of binding authority regarding whether section 631 of CIPA applies to 
electronic communications like email. 
 Two California state courts have suggested, without providing analysis, that section 631 
applies to electronic communications.  See Speaker v. Andrews, 2015 WL 6859816, at *5 (Cal. Ct. 
                                                 
4
 Google also argues that, should the Wiretap Act claim be dismissed, the Court should decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s CIPA claim because the Court would lack 
original jurisdiction over any claim.  Mot. at 18–19.  The Court need not address this argument 
because the Court denies Google’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Wiretap Act claim, as discussed 
above. 
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App. Nov. 9, 2015) (assuming that plaintiff would be entitled to damages under section 631 if 
plaintiff could establish a prima facie case that defendant read her private emails); Diamond v. 
Google, Inc., CIV-1202715 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin Cty. Aug. 14, 2013) (finding, without analysis, 
that allegations of email interception are sufficient to state a claim under section 631).  
Additionally, three federal district courts have determined that section 631 applies to electronic 
communications.  In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 922, 936 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) (concluding that CIPA applies to electronic communications); Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 
848 (applying CIPA to electronic communications); Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at*20–21 
(analyzing text and case law to determine that CIPA applies to electronic communications).  
Nonetheless, Google is correct that no binding authority exists as to whether section 631 of CIPA 
applies to electronic communications.  Therefore, according to Google, Plaintiff’s CIPA claim 
arguably “raises a novel or complex issue of State law.”  28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). 
 Novelty alone does not determine whether a district court should decline supplemental 
jurisdiction.  Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1996) (exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over a novel issue of state law because the values of “economy, 
convenience and fairness [were] best addressed by the court retaining jurisdiction”), overruled on 
other grounds by Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 1997).  Instead, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the Court should consider economy, convenience, 
fairness, and comity.  Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.   
 In the instant case, the Court finds that the values of economy, convenience and fairness 
are best advanced by the Court’s retention of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s CIPA claim.  See Allen, 
92 F.3d at 846.  The Wiretap Act and CIPA are both wiretapping statutes prohibiting the 
unauthorized interception of communications.  Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *5–6, *12–13.  As 
such, both claims require analysis of Google’s terms of service and privacy policies to determine 
whether Gmail and non-Gmail users consent to the alleged interceptions.  See id.  In addition, both 
claims in the instant case arise from the same underlying conduct: Google’s alleged interception 
and reading of emails sent to and received by Gmail users before December 19, 2014, which 
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Google analyzed for purposes of creating user profiles and targeted advertising.  Compl. ¶¶ 42–70.  
Although Plaintiff’s CIPA claim also alleges post-December 19, 2014 intercepting, scanning, and 
analysis of email, Google allegedly used the same devices to intercept, scan, and analyze email at 
all relevant times.  See id. ¶¶ 19–23.  Because Plaintiff’s Wiretap Act and CIPA claims arise from 
a common nucleus of fact and have similar legal underpinnings, the two claims will be subject to 
similar discovery and sources of proof.  Accordingly, declining supplemental jurisdiction would 
be duplicative and inefficient.  See NetApp, Inc. v. Nimble Storage, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 816, 838 
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction when federal and state claims involved the 
same underlying conduct and similar sources of proof); Lerma v. NTT McKee Retail Ctr., LLC, 
2011 WL 4948667, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011) (forcing a plaintiff to bring “a separate, nearly 
identical case in state court alleging the same facts” would waste judicial resources).   
 Moreover, the undersigned judge has previously determined the legal issue presented.  See 
Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *20–21.  In Gmail, the plaintiffs sued Google under both the 
Wiretap Act and CIPA for “intercept[ing], read[ing], and acquir[ing] the content of emails that 
were sent or received by Gmail user[s]” for the purpose of creating user profiles and targeted 
advertising.  Id. at *1.  The Court examined the text of section 631 and California Supreme Court 
decisions, and concluded that section 631 applies to electronic communications like email.  Id. at 
*20–21.  Given that the instant case alleges substantially similar conduct by Google over a 
substantially similar time period, the undersigned judge is “intimately familiar” with the facts 
underlying Plaintiff’s CIPA claim, in addition to the legal issues.  See Allen, 92 F.3d at 846.  
Therefore, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s CIPA claim substantially advances 
judicial economy, convenience and fairness.  Id. 
 Further, Plaintiff’s CIPA claim does not predominate over Plaintiff’s Wiretap Act claim.  
As previously stated, Plaintiff’s Wiretap Act and CIPA claims have related factual and legal 
underpinnings.  See Compl. ¶¶ 42–70.  Therefore, “[t]he state law claim[] do[es] not predominate 
because the underlying conduct is the same and will likely involve similar sources of proof.”  
NetApp, 41 F. Supp. 3d at 838.  In light of the foregoing, the Court elects to retain supplemental 
 31 
Case No. 15-CV-04062-LHK    
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO THE MERITS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
D
is
tr
ic
t 
C
o
u
rt
 
N
o
rt
h
er
n
 D
is
tr
ic
t 
o
f 
C
al
if
o
rn
ia
 
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s CIPA claim. 
2. Merits 
Section 631 of CIPA establishes liability for: 
[a]ny person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any 
other manner, intentionally taps, or makes any unauthorized connection, whether 
physically, electrically, acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph 
or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument, including the wire, line, cable, or 
instrument of any internal telephonic communication system, or who willfully and 
without the consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized 
manner, reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any 
message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any 
wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state 
. . . . 
Cal. Penal Code § 631 (emphasis added).  In Gmail, the Court concluded that this provision 
applies to email and thus that the interception of email without consent violates California law.  
Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *20–21.   
In the instant case, Google asks the Court to reconsider the Gmail holding.  Google 
specifically argues that (a) CIPA is limited to communications that pass over telephone and 
telegraph wires, and thus does not apply to email; (b) legislative intent demonstrates that CIPA is 
limited to eavesdropping, not email privacy; (c) Gmail mistakenly concluded that California 
statutes generally apply to new technologies and thus CIPA applies to email; and (d) amendments 
to a related statute without corresponding amendments to CIPA demonstrate an intent not to apply 
section 631 to email.  The Court addresses Google’s arguments respectively. 
a. Plain Language of CIPA 
 The Court begins with the statutory text.  In particular, there are two clauses in section 631.  
The first clause of section 631 creates liability for any individual who “intentionally taps, or 
makes any unauthorized connection . . . with any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or 
instrument.”  Cal. Penal Code § 631.  The second clause of the statute creates liability for any 
individual who “reads, or attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, 
report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is 
being sent from, or received at any place within this state.”  Id.  As this Court noted in Gmail, the 
second clause of section 631, as opposed to the first clause, is not limited to communications 
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passing over “telegraph or telephone” wires, lines, or cables.  See Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at 
*20.  Rather, the plain language of the second clause prohibits the unauthorized interception of 
communications passing over “any wire, line, or cable.”  Cal. Penal Code § 631 (emphasis added).  
This language encompasses email communications, which pass over wires, lines, or cables.   
Google concedes that the limitation of “telegraph or telephone” in the first clause of the 
statute is not explicitly repeated in the second clause, but argues that it is “nonsensical” to assume 
that the California Legislature intended section 631 to cover two categories of wires, lines, and 
cables.  Mot. at 25 n.25.  However, the Court finds no reason to conclude that the limitation of 
“telegraph or telephone” on “wire, line, cable, or instrument” in the first clause of the statute 
should be imported to the second clause of the statute.  In other words, while the first clause of 
section 631 explicitly applies to “instrument[s]” in addition to “wire[s], line[s], [and] cable[s],” the 
second clause applies only to “wire[s], line[s], [and] cable[s].”  This difference in coverage 
between the first and second clauses suggests that the Legislature intended two separate clauses 
applying to different types of communications.  See Gmail, 2013 WL 5423918, at *20.  
Accordingly, the Court rejects Google’s argument that the second clause of CIPA is limited to 
telephone and telegraph communications, and finds that CIPA applies to email. 
b. Legislative Intent 
The Court turns to Google’s contention that legislative intent indicates that CIPA does not 
apply to email.  Mot. at 20–21.  Google highlights section 630 of CIPA, which is titled 
“Legislative finding and intent.”  Section 630 states: 
The Legislature hereby declares that advances in science and technology have led 
to the development of new devices and techniques for the purpose of 
eavesdropping upon private communications and that the invasion of privacy 
resulting from the continual and increasing use of such devices and techniques has 
created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be 
tolerated in a free and civilized society. 
Cal. Penal Code § 630.  Google points out that Black’s Law Dictionary defines eavesdropping as 
“secretly listening to the private conversation of others without their consent.”  Relying upon this 
definition, Google contends that “CIPA should not be interpreted to reach technologies like email 
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that cannot be ‘eavesdropped’ in any sense of the word.”  Mot. at 20.   
 However, Google ignores that Black’s Law Dictionary provides a second definition of 
eavesdropping, which is “a clandestine attempt to overhear or intercept others’ private 
communication.”  See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  The alleged interception, 
scanning, and analysis of Plaintiff’s private communications fall squarely within this definition of 
eavesdropping.   
 Moreover, Google fails to acknowledge the next paragraph in section 630, “Legislative 
finding and intent”: “The Legislature by this chapter intends to protect the right of privacy of the 
people of this state.”  This expression of intent is broader than protection against “eavesdropping.”  
Moreover, the California Legislature chose to “protect the right of privacy of the people of this 
state” by enacting the prohibitions in section 631.  Indeed, the California Supreme Court has 
repeatedly found that the California Legislature intended CIPA to establish strong privacy 
protections.  For example, the California Supreme Court has stated: “In enacting [CIPA], the 
Legislature declared in broad terms its intent to protect the right of privacy of the people of this 
state from what it perceived as a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties that cannot 
be tolerated in a free and civilized society.  This philosophy appears to lie at the heart of virtually 
all the decisions construing [CIPA].”  Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal. 4th 766, 775 (2002) (internal 
quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted); Ribas v. Clark, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 361 (1985) 
(finding it is “probable” that the California Legislature designed section 631 as a catch all to 
“proscrib[e] attempts to circumvent other aspects of the Privacy Act, e.g., by requesting a 
secretary to secretly transcribe a conversation over an extension, rather than tape recording it in 
violation of section 632”); Tavernetti v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 187, 195 (1978) (“Th[e] 
forceful expression of the constitutional stature of privacy rights [in California] reflects a concern 
previously evinced by the Legislature in enacting the invasion of privacy provisions of the Penal 
Code.”).   
In light of this intent, the California Supreme Court has instructed courts to interpret CIPA 
in the manner that “fulfills the legislative purpose of [CIPA] by giving greater protection to 
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privacy interests.”  Flanagan, 27 Cal. 4th at 775.  Thus, when faced with two possible 
interpretations of CIPA, the California Supreme Court has construed CIPA in accordance with the 
interpretation that provides the greatest privacy protection.  See Ribas, 38 Cal. 3d at 360–61.  This 
Court, when applying California law, “must apply the law as it believes the California Supreme 
Court would apply it.”  Kairy v. SuperShuttle Int’l, 660 F.3d 1146, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011). 
In light of section 630’s statement that CIPA is intended to “protect the right of privacy of the 
people this this state,” and the California Supreme Court’s findings about the legislative intent of 
CIPA, the Court concludes that the California Supreme Court would find that legislative intent 
supports the application of CIPA to email. 
c. Application of Statutes to New Technologies  
 Next, Google argues that CIPA does not apply to email because email did not exist at the 
time of CIPA’s enactment.  Mot. at 22.  Thus, according to Google, the California Legislature 
could not have envisioned the application of CIPA to email. 
The California Supreme Court, however, regularly reads statutes to apply to new 
technologies where such a reading would not conflict with the statutory scheme.  The California 
Supreme Court stated this principle plainly in Apple Inc. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 4th 128, 137 
(2013) (ellipsis in original): “Fidelity to legislative intent does not ‘make it impossible to apply a 
legal text to technologies that did not exist when the text was created. . . .  Drafters of every era 
know that technological advances will proceed apace and that the rules they create will one day 
apply to all sorts of circumstances they could not possibly envision.”  Thus, that a technology did 
not exist at the time of a statute’s enactment does not necessarily preclude the application of the 
statute to that technology.  See id. at 139–41.   
As another example, in Davis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph, 127 Cal. 312, 316 (1899), 
the California Supreme Court interpreted the term “telegraph” functionally based on the type of 
communication that was enabled.  Specifically, the California Supreme Court held that the phrase 
“telegraph lines” in a criminal law proscribing the cutting of lines included telephone lines 
because “[t]he idea conveyed by each term is the sending of intelligence to a distance . . . [thus] 
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the term ‘telegraph’ means any apparatus for transmitting messages by means of electric currents 
and signals, and embraces within its meaning the narrower word ‘telephone.’”  Davis, 127 Cal. at 
316. 
In the instant motion, Google contends that Davis is inapposite because the California 
Supreme Court rejected Davis in Sunset Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Pasadena, 161 Cal. 
265 (1911).  However, Sunset Telephone did not in fact reject Davis.  Instead, Sunset Telephone 
concluded that Davis’s interpretation of the word “telegraph” in the context of the California Penal 
Code did not govern the interpretation of the word “telegraph” as used in a provision of the 
California Civil Code addressing public grants to use public streets and highways.  161 Cal. at 
274–75.  Sunset Telephone noted that public grant statutes are strictly construed in favor of the 
public, and thus found that a statute granting telegraph companies the right to use public streets 
and highways should be read narrowly and thus did not permit telephone companies the same 
right.  Id. at 273, 279–80.  The rules of construction applicable to public grant statutes do not 
apply to CIPA.  Moreover, since Sunset Telephone, the California Supreme Court has reaffirmed 
Davis and Davis’s inclusion of “telephone” within the term “telegraph.”  See, e.g., People v. 
Trieber, 28 Cal. 2d 657, 661 (1946); Ex parte Cannon, 167 Cal. 142, 143–44 (1914).  
Because the California Supreme Court regularly reads statutes to apply to new 
technologies where such a reading would not conflict with the statutory scheme, the Court is 
unpersuaded by Google’s argument that CIPA can not apply to email because email did not exist 
at the time of CIPA’s enactment.   
Further, the Court sees no conflict between the statutory scheme and applying CIPA to 
email.  Google contends that exposing electronic communication service providers like Google to 
“massive potential liability” for routine business conduct would be inconsistent with the statutory 
scheme.  Mot. at 23–25.  However, Plaintiff alleges that the interceptions at issue in the instant 
case do not facilitate and are not incidental to Google’s provision of email services.  See Compl. 
¶¶ 19, 22–23, 28 (“Google intercepts Gmail for the distinct purpose of acquiring and retaining user 
data and creating targeted advertising . . . .”).  Thus, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, liability 
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for the interceptions alleged does not threaten Google’s ability to provide electronic 
communication services.  Moreover, Google may seek the consent of its users and other parties to 
these communications for any interceptions that Google wishes to undertake.  See Cal. Penal Code 
§ 631(a) (providing that interception is unlawful if done “without the consent of all parties to the 
communication”).  Accordingly, the Court concludes that neither the statutory scheme nor the fact 
that email did not exist at the time of CIPA’s enactment prohibit the application of section 631 to 
email. 
d. Legislative History 
 Lastly, the Court addresses Google’s argument that amendments to California’s Wiretap 
Act, Cal. Penal Code § 629.50 et seq., without corresponding amendments to CIPA, demonstrate 
that section 631 does not apply to email.  California’s Wiretap Act governs interceptions of wire 
and electronic communications by law enforcement.  Google points to two instances, in 1995 and 
2010, in which the California Legislature amended California’s Wiretap Act to expressly cover 
electronic communications, but did not make corresponding amendments to CIPA.  See Google 
RJN Exs. I, J (California Bill Analyses by a California Senate Committee).  In 1995, the 
California Senate Judiciary Committee noted in its bill analysis that “[i]t is not clear that 
California law specifically protects e-mail and other electronic communications from improper 
interception by either private parties or law enforcement” and asked whether, “as a corollary” to 
the extension of California’s Wiretap Act, “the privacy laws [should] be amended to expressly 
protect electronic communications from interception by anyone in the absence of a court order.”  
Id. Ex. I, at 4.  Google contends that the failure of the Legislature to amend CIPA shows that 
CIPA should not cover email, and highlights the U.S. Supreme Court’s statement that “[w]hen 
Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted 
intentionally.”  See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009).   
 Gross is distinguishable.  In Gross, Congress amended the ADEA and Title VII at the 
same time, and only the Title VII amendments included a particular provision at issue in the case.  
Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that “negative implications raised by disparate provisions are 
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strongest when the provisions were considered simultaneously when the language raising the 
implication was inserted.”  Id. at 175(internal quotation marks omitted).  By contrast, here Google 
points to no bill amending CIPA that was contemporaneous with the amendments expanding 
California’s Wiretap Act.  See Google RJN Exs. K–M (highlighting earlier proposed amendments 
to CIPA, in 1986 and 1990).   
Nor does Google point to any bill in which the California Legislature considered and 
rejected amending CIPA to include email.  The California Supreme Court has stated that 
legislative inaction may indicate many things, including the “sheer pressure of other and more 
important business, political considerations, or a tendency to trust to the courts to correct their own 
errors.”  Cty. of L.A. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 30 Cal. 3d 391, 403–04 (1981) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In the absence of any amendments to CIPA contemporaneous with the 
amendments to California’s Wiretap Act, or the affirmative rejection of a proposal to apply CIPA 
to email, the Court finds minimal value in the Legislature’s inaction with respect to amending 
CIPA.   
 In sum, in light of the plain language of section 631, the legislative intent underlying CIPA 
to protect privacy, and the California Supreme Court’s approach to applying statutes to new 
technologies, the Court finds that Gmail’s application of section 631 to email was correct.  The 
Court notes that following Gmail, two courts in this district have applied section 631 to electronic 
communications similar to email.  In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d at 936 
(holding that section 631 applies to “electronic communications”); Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 
848 (finding that plaintiffs stated a claim under section 631 when defendant allegedly intercepted 
online Facebook messages).  By contrast, Google points to no case in which a court has concluded 
that section 631 does not apply to email.  In line with the foregoing analysis and the weight of 
authority, the Court DENIES Google’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s CIPA claim. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Google’s motion to dismiss as to the merits 
of Plaintiff’s claims. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated: August 12, 2016 
______________________________________ 
LUCY H. KOH 
United States District Judge 
